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“Excess Volatility” and the German Stock Market
1876-1990
J. Bradford De Long 





This paper uses long-run real price and dividends series to 
investigate for the German stock market the questions asked of 
the U.S. market by Shiller (1989). It tries to determine in what 
periods and to what degree the German stock market has also 
possessed “excess volatility” in the past century. It finds no 
evidence of excess volatility in the pre-World War I German stock 
market. By contrast, there is some evidence of excess volatility in 
the post-World War II German stock market. The role played by 
the German Grofibanken in the pre-World War I stock market 
might be the cause of the low comparative volatility of German 
stock indices before 1914.
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This paper examines “excess volatility” in the German stock market, 
investigating for that market the issues examined by Robert Shiller (1981, 1986, 
1989) for the U.S. stock market.2 It finds some evidence that post-World War II 
German stock index prices have been too volatile (relative to naïve estimates of 
fundamentals) to have been rational forecasts of the present value of future 
dividends. Alternatively, pre-World War I stock prices were not volatile enough 
(relative to naïve estimates of fundamentals).3 In either case, the efficient 
markets hypothesis appears inconsistent with observed behavior in one or the 
other of the periods.4 The focus of this paper is on the divergence of market 
outcomes in the two periods, and the difficulty of reconciling both patterns 
simultaneously with the efficient markets hypothesis.
This paper examines the volatility of prices relative to dividends in order to 
avoid most of the biases in estimated volatility ratios generated by Shiller’s 
(1981) original tests. Thus normalized, the pre-World War I German stock 
market shows not excess but deficient volatility: the market price-dividend ratio 
is surprisingly far down in the lower tail of the distribution under the null 
hypothesis that prices are rational forecasts of fundamentals. Throughout the 
pre-World War I era, the market average dividend yield fluctuates in a narrow 
band between four and a half and five and a percent. By contrast, the post-World 
War II stock market (and especially the post-Wirtschaftswunder market) shows 
some evidence of “excess” volatility. The evidence of excess volatility in post- 
World War II German data is weaker than but of the same order of magnitude as 
the evidence using U.S. post-World War II data.
The behavior of the pre-World War I German stock market thus is in sharp 
contrast to the behavior of the post-World War II German stock market, and to 
the behavior of the U.S. stock market in either the pre-World War I or the post- 
World War II period. We speculate that the dominance of the German 
Grojibanken in the securities industry in the years before World War I may be 
the cause of the exceptional behavior of the pre-World War I German market.
2The literature sparked by Shiller and by LeRoy and Porter (1981) has for the most part assumed that the real 
interest rate at which future dividends are discounted is a constant. This assumption is surely false: for example, 
the ex anle real rale of discount for the U.S. stock market at the end of World War I was on the order of thirty 
percent per year for the first two years after the war in anticipation of the forthcoming postwar deflation. Thus it 
was much higher than the discount rate during normal times. However, investigators have had little success 
accounting for stock price volatility via shifts in the real riskless rate, or in the real spread between riskless and 
market rates of discount driven by changes in risk tolerance (see Shiller, 1989).
■^Understood to also include the ancillary assumption of a constant real discount rate.
4Little can be said about the relative excess volatility of the German stock market over 1914-50; there are too 




























































































After this introduction, the second section of this paper describes the data 
used. The third section explains the approach used and documents the 
divergence between the pre-World War I and the post-World War II behavior of 
German stock market aggregates. The generating processes necessary to 
reconcile the post-World War II behavior of German stock index prices with the 
efficient markets hypothesis lead to the conclusion that the market’s small 
degree of volatility in the pre-World War I era is anomalous. Generating 
processes that fit the market’s low pre-World War I volatility lead to the 
conclusion that the post-World War II market exhibits excess volatility. Unless 
the specification of the dividend process is itself a free variable that shifts 
substantially from World War I to post-World War II reconstruction, it is very 
difficult to reconcile both periods with the dividend discount model.
Section IV speculates that the role played by the Grofibanken, the “great 
banks” that were at once investment bankers, long-term stockholders in 
corporations, and depositories of savings, may be responsible for the exceptional 
behavior of the pre-World War I German market (Riesser, 1906 and 1911). 
Perhaps the pre-World War I German stock market behaves differently because 
its prices are not driven by the “animal spirits” of speculators, but are instead 
administered assessments of fundamental values made by a handful of large and 
well-informed institutions.
Section V provides a brief summary of the argument. Appendices discuss the 
choices made in constructing the data, and the statistical significance of some of 
the results obtained.
II. German Data
Donner (1934) compiles and reports a monthly nominal share price index— 
with attached estimates of average yearly dividend yields for the companies 
included in his aggregate index—for the German stock market from January 
1870 to December 1913. His index covers only twelve companies from 1870 to 
1875.5 The number of companies covered reaches twenty-one in 1876 and is 
nearly sixty by 1890. The original twelve companies covered in 1870 include four 
banks, four railroads, and four mining companies.6 Railroads disappear from the 
index with their nationalization in 1890. Companies in other industries are
5Earlier indices covering the 1856-70 period are also available from Dabritz (1929). Unfortunately, they too are 
based on a very small sample of securities.
6Two mining companies—the Bochumer Verein fiir Bergbau and GuBstahlfabrik and the Hoerder Bergwerks- 




























































































added as industrialization proceeds.7
Especially in the years from 1890 on, the Donner index is a sample of 
Germany’s largest companies, weighted toward those heavy industries in which 
Germany’s companies were largest and its international comparative advantage 
greatest. We begin our study in 1876, when the number of companies in the 
index rises above twenty.
Donner’s index ends with the beginning of World War I. An official index— 
unfortunately without dividends attached—covers the period from 1914 up to the 
1923-24 hyperinflation (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1922a, 1922b). A second official 
index covering three hundred corporations extends from 1924 to the middle of 
World War II, reporting both the stock index price and a dividend yield 
(Statistisches Reichsamt, 1928, 1929). We splice the first official Statistisches 
Reichsamt (National Bureau of Statistics) series onto Donner’s in 1914 to track 
the course of the German stock market up to the hyperinflation. We splice the 
second Reichsamt index onto the first to provide information about the course of 
the German stock market between the hyperinflation and the middle of World 
War II.
For the post-World War II period, the stock price series we use links four 
official portfolio index series constructed by the post-World War II Statistisches 
Bundesamt (Federal Bureau of Statistics). We link from each series to the next 
in the first year in which the following sequence becomes available (see 
Herrman, 1956; Spellerberg and Schneider, 1967; Silberman, 1974; Liitzel and 
Jung, 1984; Statistisches Bundesamt, 1985).
For the later interwar and the post-World War II periods, the yield series 
used is the yield on all traded stocks. Thus the yield is calculated from a 
different and larger sample of corporations than are the price indices. 
Nevertheless, the post-World War II dividend series—calculated by multiplying 
price and yield—is a good estimate of the dividend corresponding to the index.8
The nominal price and dividend series are deflated by the German consumer 
price index endorsed by the Deutsche Bundesbank (1976). This index runs 
continuously, with one gap covering World War II and the post-war 
reconstruction period.9
7On the eve of World War I, the index covers eight banks, two shipping companies, fourteen mining and steel 
producers, four electrical machinery manufacturers, four utilities, nine metalworking manufacturers, six in 
chemicals, seven in textiles, two in paper and wood products, three makers of building materials, two 
construction companies, three glass and porcelein manufacturers, and four breweries.
8The post-World War II price index series covers close to ninety-five percent of the par value of stocks traded 
on the German exchanges.




























































































Appendix 1 presents the various alternative stock price and dividend yield 
series available for the German market. Its table A.l reports the underlying real 
stock price, yield, and consumer price index series used here. In all cases we use 
annual average prices and annual average dividend yields. The ways in which 
earlier authors report their results make annual average data more readily 
available than point-in-time data. Moreover, markets for many of the securities 
in the indices are thin. Transitory episodes of market disruption—like the 
liquidity crunch that followed the bankruptcy of the Austrian Creditanstalt 
during the Great Depression—are not uncommon. With point in time data, such 
events could introduce noise into a market that may be exhibiting relatively good 
performance save for transitory disruptions of its microstructures.
Figure 1 plots the log values of real price and dividend indices for the 
German stock market since 1876. Between 1876 and 1913, stock prices rise by 
approximately 125 percent, with prices being nearly a constant times 
dividends—the aggregate dividend yield for the market (although not the yield 
for individual firms) is always close 5 percent. The pre-World War I price- 
dividend ratio is slightly countercyclical, rising when dividends fall and falling 
when dividends rise.
The first interwar price series tracks the fall in real stock values by more 
than four-fifths from 1913 to 1922. In the first years after the hyperinflation and 
before the Great Depression, real prices nearly quadruple from their 
hyperinflation-era lows. Prices then fall by two thirds in the early years of the 
Depression, with a sharp drop in 1931.10 Stock prices recover as Germany 
recovers from the Depression and real wages are squeezed by Nazi rule.
(1947), who investigated the standard of living of Geman workers since 1800. Kuczynski’s cost of living index 
consists of estimates of food prices and housing costs. From 1915tol919the index is derived from 
calculations by the Statislisches Bundesamt, the Federal Statistical Bureau of post-World War II West 
Germany, made after World War II in order to close the gap between Kuczynski’s and the subsequent indices. 
From 1920 to 1940 the cost of living index is that compiled for a Five-person working-class household by the 
Statislisches Reichsamt, the National Statistical Bureau of fust the Weimar Republic and then the Third Reich. 
For the post-World War II years from 1949 to the present, the cost of living index used is that calculated for a 
four-person middle-class household by the Statislisches Bundesamt (1990). The different consumer price series 
have different base years. They chart the changes in the price level for different consumption bundles, and are 
not completely consistent. The Deutsche Bundesbank (1976) reports similar indices for wholesale prices, and a 
less complete national product deflator.
10The year that sees the bankruptcy of the Austrian Creditanstalt Bank and a severe liquidity crisis throughout 
Europe that was especially severe in German-speaking nations.One of the extended repercussions of the 
Creditanstalt crisis was the fall of the Labour government and the abandonment of the gold standard in Britain. 





























































































German Real Stock Prices and Dividends 1876-1990 
(Log Scale)
#Log Real Stock Price +  Log Real Dividend/.05
Note that decade-by-decade fluctuations in German real dividends before 
World War II are of larger proportional magnitudes than decade-by-decade 
fluctuations in real price indices. In this respect the pre-World War II German 
stock market is different from the United States, where decade-by-decade price 
fluctuations are proportionally larger than dividend fluctuations (see Barsky and 
De Long, 1989 and 1990).
Post-World War II data begin in 1951. Throughout the 1950’s real prices and 
dividends rise very rapidly—by a factor of eight—with the price-dividend ratio 
reaching a high near fifty in 1960. Since 1960 the index has recorded relatively 
slow growth in real prices and dividends. Even so, price changes have been 
substantial: the real stock index falls by nearly half between 1960 and 1966. It 
more than doubles over the short four year period between 1981 and 1985.
From 1960 on, fluctuations in prices have been proportionately larger than 
fluctuations in dividends. Over 1960-66, the log of real stock prices falls by 0.55 
while log real dividends fall by only 0.2; over 1966-72, log prices rise by 0.3 while 
log dividends rise by 0.2; over 1972-82, log prices fall once again by 0.55 while 
log dividends fall by only 0.15; and over 1982-1990 log prices rise by 1.1 while 




























































































in dividend levels are paced by more than proportional swings in prices, is 
reminiscent of the behavior of the U.S. stock market, as analyzed by Barsky and 
De Long (1989). It suggests that investors value the market by extrapolating 
recent dividend changes into the future.
The real stock price series constructed here has a gap covering the second 
half of World War II and the postwar reconstruction period from 1943—1950. We 
have been unable to recover sufficient data on dividend yields and price indices 
to link the series across this period. The real price indices are not comparable 
across the break at the end of World War II.1 1
The real dividend series has two breaks. One covers World War I and the 
interwar period up to the hyperinflation. The second covers the end of World 
War II and the postwar reconstruction period. Thus we do not have enough data 
to conduct Shiller-like analyses of the era from the beginning of World War I to 
the beginning of the 1950’s.
This paper analyzes the pre-World War I and the post-World War II periods 
separately. For the pre-World War I period, it takes 1913 as its terminal 
condition: the level of real stock prices in 1913 is a proxy for the rational 
expectation, on the eve of the unexpected coming of World War I, of the 
fundamental value of German securities. The level of stock prices in 1990 stands 
in for the rational expectation of the expected value of German securities today.
III. Excess Volatility and the German Stock Market
Shiller’s (1981, 1989) first key insight was that the level of the stock market 
is a forecast of the ex post perfect-foresight fundamental. An investor who buys 
and holds, and pays less than the ex post fundamental, receives a supernormal 
return. Arbitrage, therefore, pushes prices in an efficient market to be efficient 
forecasts of the perfect-foresight fundamental.
Shiller’s second key insight was to apply the principal that efficient forecasts 
are less volatile than the ex post realized values of the quantities being forecast. 
If a forecast is more volatile, a better forecast could be constructed easily: shrink 
the original forecast toward its ex ante unconditional mean, and the resulting
1 'The failure of Ihe German stock market to fall in real terms during the war or during the approach to war is 
somewhat surprising. To some degree, wartime prices are false prices. Although trading on the Frankfurt 
exchange continues until three days before the arrival of the American army, prices on the exchange are frozen
in March 1943. Foreign quotations on the market had been prohibited as early as 1937. And dividends had been 
regulated from early in the National Socialist era. After December 1934 dividend payments to shareholders 
could not exceed six percent Any excess was paid into a “Patriotic Fund." Although credited to shareholders’ 




























































































improved forecast will have a smaller mean squared error. These two insights 
imply that if the efficient markets hypothesis holds then stock prices should be 
less volatile—relative to their ex ante unconditional means, a notion that needs 
to be made precise—than the realized track of the ex post perfect-foresight 
fundamental.
Biases in Testing for Excess Volatility
As Flavin (1985), Scott (1985), Kleidon (1986a and 1986b), Mankiw, Romer, 
and Shapiro (1985,1991), and many others have argued, Shiller’s (1981) original 
comparison of the variance of detrended prices and of detrended ex post perfect- 
foresight fundamentals is subject to biases. Especially in small samples, such 
tests may well find apparent excess volatility even if in fact the efficient markets 
hypothesis holds.
It is easiest to understand the source of these biases by examining the 
trading strategies associated with tests of excess volatility and return 
predictability. Each test of market rationality is implicitly associated with a 
portfolio strategy. If prices are too volatile relative to trend, investors at the time 
could have made better forecasts of ex post fundamentals—and earned high 
profits—-by taking as their forecast some linear combination of the market price 
and a time trend, and betting that returns would be low whenever the market 
price was above the trend. If returns are predictable from a variable like the 
price-dividend ratio (Scott, 1985), investors could have earned supernormal 
profits by buying when the ratio was low and selling when it was high.
If investors could in fact have followed the trading strategy implicit in the 
tests of market efficiency—and did not—then the rejection of market efficiency is 
genuine. But under some conditions the implicit trading strategy could not have 
been followed because it required more information for its execution than 
investors at the time possessed. In such a case, the rejection of market efficiency 
may well be spurious: investors may well have taken advantage of all profit 
opportunities open to them, and given the information at their disposal prices 
may have been the best available forecasts of the present value of fundamentals.
For example, suppose log dividends follow a random walk with drift:
(1) d, = d, . i + g + e,




























































































unforecastable before period t. With a constant discount rate r, the efficient 
markets log real stock price will be:
(2) Pt = -ln(r-g) + d
Suppose an ex post time trend x is fitted to the first and last observations, t=0 
and t=T:
(3) 7tt = po+Tl ( p T-Po)
Calculate the covariance between the one-year realized return r*tx:
(4) r*’ = r + E
and the price relative to the ex post time trend (conditional on knowledge of the 
current price pt and of the current value Xt of the ex post trend):
(5) E {  r*t' (Pl-Xt) I pt-K }  = * {  ^  }  E { t i ' PfK. }
Equation (5) shows that there are excess returns from buying when the price is 
low relative to the ex post trend, and selling when it is high. Such a strategy eans 
excess returns off of the correlation between the deviation of the price from the 
ex post trend and future innovations.
Why don’t rational investors take advantage of this correlation? Because at 
the time they must trade they do not yet know what the end-of-sample value xt 
will be, and so cannot calculate the current value of the ex post time trend xt- 
Investors would love to know xt—such knowledge would allow them to calculate 
the value of the sum of the e innovations yet to come. But they do not.
The return predictability in equation (5) comes solely from the use of the 
realized values of future shocks—shocks dated later than t—in constructing the 
value xt of the time trend, and in assessing whether prices are relatively low or 
high. Without this use of information about the realizations of future shocks, 
there are no excess returns to be earned: returns are uncorrelated with the 
deviation of the price from an ex ante time trend x’t constructed by extrapolating 




























































































(6) n' = Po + tg
(7) E {r*‘ (pt-Jt't)l pt, Jt't ) = O
In this example, a regression of returns on prices and an ex post time trend is 
indeed likely to find significant return predictability and excess volatility. But 
such a finding is spurious: it arises from an implicit assumption that rational 
investors had more information about future shocks than they in fact possessed 
future shocks.
Normalizing by the Level of Dividends
To compensate for such biases, Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (1985 and 
1991) proposed an alternative benchmark for the calculation of excess volatility. 
They argued that it is plausible that past investors knew naive forecasts of 
perfect-foresight fundamentals made by assuming them to be a constant 
dividend multiple. Tests of excess volatility relative to this alternative naive- 
forecast benchmark that takes fundamentals to be a constant multiple of 
dividends assume less in terms of investors’ knowledge of the parameters and 
outcomes of the dividend process.
This paper uses such a naive constant dividend multiple forecast as the 
benchmark against which to evaluate the efficient markets hypothesis.12 It 
normalizes real prices and ex post fundamentals by the current level of 
dividends. Figure 2 plots real prices and ex post fundamentals normalized by a 
constant—twenty—multiple of dividends, for a real discount rate of 8 percent 
chosen to match real returns over the century as a whole.
l2Note, however, that it is possible to imagine situations—especially in circumstances of rapid development 
and uncertain long-run growth paths—in which even the assumption that investors know ex ante of the average 
pricc/dividend ratio is incorrect, and in fact attributes to past investors information that they do not but would 




























































































In figure 2 the pre-World War I stock market does not appear excessively 
volatile to the eye: the volatility of prices relative to the benchmark of twenty 
times dividends is smaller than the volatility of ex post fundamentals. The post- 
World War II market does see a larger volatility for prices relative to the twenty 
times dividends benchmark than for ex post fundamentals after 1960. The 
decade before 1960 sees both prices and ex post fundamentals very far from 
normal multiples of dividends.
Pre-World. War I and Post-World War II Prices, and Perfect-Foresight 
Fundamentals
Figures 3 and 4 provide individual looks at the behavior of prices, dividends, 
and perfect-foresight fundamentals in the pre-World War I and post-World War 
II periods. They plot for each of these periods the log levels of prices, the log ex 
post perfect-foresight fundamental (calculated using an eight percent per year 
real discount rate), and also the log level of dividends (multiplied by twenty in 





























































































German Real Stock Market Values, Perfect-Foresight Fundamentals, and 
Dividends for the Pre-World War I Period
(8% Discount Rate; Terminal Condition in 1913)
Note the wider variability of stock prices in the post-World War II period 
that leads figure 4 to have a much larger vertical scale than figure 3. Figure 3 
has a vertical scale that shows less than a tripling of real prices and dividends. 
By contrast, figure 4 has a vertical scale that captures a twelvefold 
multiplication in the level. Figure 3 shows that stock price and dividend indices 
move together throughout the pre-World War I period. The mean price-dividend 
ratio is approximately twenty. The maximum proportional deviation of the price- 
dividend ratio from its mean is less than a tenth; from 1876 to 1913 the dividend 






























































































German Real Stock Market Value, Perfect-Foresight Fundamentals, and 
Dividends for the Post-World War II Period
(8% Discount Rate; Terminal Condition in 1990)
•  Log Real Stock Price +  Log Perfect-Foresight Fundamental X  Log Real Dividends/.05
Figure 3 also shows that the price-dividend ratio moves countercyclically. 
Boom years like 1890 or 1899 see real dividends at local peaks. Such years also 
see the price-dividend ratio at relatively low levels. Slump years like 1886 or 
1902 which see dividends at local minima see relatively high price-dividend 
ratios. Thus stock price fluctuations are damped, not amplified, images of 
dividend fluctuations.13 In booms the stock market expects future real dividends 
to fall. In depressions the stock market expects future real dividends to rise.
Figure 4 shows another pattern. Dividends rise quickly from very low levels 
in the 1950’s —the period of the “economic miracle.” In 1955 real dividends are 
five times their 1951 level. In 1960 real dividends are eighty percent above their 
1955 levels. Real prices rise rapidly from 1951 to 1960, rising by a cumulative 
factor of more than eight over the decade. The price-dividend ratio is almost one 
hundred at the beginning of the 1950’s as firms skimp on payouts to increase 
capital available for reinvestment. The price-dividend ratio falls until 1957, 13




























































































reaching a value in the low twenties. It then rises and reaches another peak, 
near fifty, at the end of the 1950’s.
Since 1960 and the end of the Wirtschaftswunder, the real value of the 
German stock market index has risen by relatively little. Real values in 1989 
were only some twenty-five percent above their 1960 levels. By contrast, real 
dividends have doubled over their 1960 levels. This stagnation in the level of the 
market over the past generation has been accompanied by substantial short-run 
swings in the real index price. Of these, the largest in magnitude is the four-year 
bull market from 1981 to 1985. It saw real prices nearly triple.
Volatility Ratios
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the volatility of the German stock 
market. For comparative purposes it reports similar statistics for the United 
States stock market as well. If actual prices were rational estimates of 
fundamentals, they should exhibit less volatility relative to some naïve forecast 
than do the ex post perfect-foresight fundamentals themselves.14 Table 1 follows 
Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro by normalizing prices and ex post fundamentals by 
the value of dividends: implicitly take the “naïve" forecast to be a constant 
multiple—twenty—times dividends. Such a forecast based on dividends and the 
average price-dividend ratio was available to investors at the time under the 
relatively weak assumptions that investors knew the required rate of return and 
the average annual upward rate of drift—not the ex post time trend—of 
dividends.
The third column of table 1 analyzes the post-Wirtschaftswunder period on 
its own. This is motivated by the likelihood that the rapid postwar-recovery 
régime and economic structure found in Germany in the 1950’s had different 
characteristics than the rest of the post-World War II period. In the 1950’s real 
dividends were very low and dividend growth was very high, as corporations 
sought to retain earnings and plow them back into investment. The assumption 
that even a naïve forecast of fundamentals would take them to be the same 
multiple of dividends in the 1950’s as later is potentially hazardous. In addition, 
the nearly twenty percent per year average realized rate of return in the 1950’s 
is far from the eight percent per year realized rate of return found on average in 
the pre-World War I and post-1960 periods, and suggests a different underlying 
structure.
14Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro have an illuminating discussion distinguishing between "variance ratios” and 
“volatility ratios.” Volatility ratios are mean squared errors around ex ante means or naive forecasts. Variance 
ratios are mean squared deviations from ex post sample averages. The difference between them can be neglected 





























































































Volatility Tests for the German and American Stock Markets
Pre-WWI Post-WWII Post-Miracle Pre-WWI and
G e rm a ny (1876-1913) (1951-90) (1960-90) Post-WWII
Volatility of p-p*... 0.082 0.168 0.182 0.123
Volatility of p-d... 0.005 0.264 0.171 0.136
Volatility of p*d... 0.101 0.324 0.142 0.159
Volatility ratio: p-d and p 'd... 0.05 0.81 1.20 0.77
Volatility ratio: p-p' and p 'd... 0.81 0.62 1.28 0.86
Sum of ratios 0.86 1.43 2.48 1.63
Significance: IMA(1,6) 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.02
Significance: ECM (0=0.5) 0.99 0.07 0.01 0.03
U nited  S ta tes Pre-WWI Post-WWII Entire Century
Volatility of p-p*... 0.041 0.157 0.131
Volatility of p-d... 0.029 0.057 0.062
Volatility ol p'-d... 0.019 0.056 0.055
Volatility ratio: p-d and p’ d... 1.53 1.02 1.13
Volatility ratio: p-p' and p 'd 2.16 2.80 2.38
Sum of ratios 3.69 3.82 3.51
Significance: IMA(1,6) 0.01 0.01 0.01
Significance: ECM (0=0.5) 0.01 0.01 0.01
The first line of table 1 shows the volatility of log prices (p) around the log of 
the perfect-foresight fundamental (p*), calculated using an eight percent per 
year real discount rate. Volatility about perfect-foresight fundamentals is 
smaller before World War I than after World War II by a factor of three. This 
difference does not arise from the period of rapid stock market price and 
dividend growth in the 1950’s. When the Wi rt sc hafts w under decade of the 1950’s 
is excluded from the post-World War II sample, the mean squared error of log 
prices around perfect-foresight fundamentals is almost unchanged.15
The second line shows the volatility of the log price-dividend ratio (p - d) 
around a fixed constant of twenty, the average ex post price-dividend ratio for the




























































































pre-World War I period. The second line thus calculates the volatility of prices 
about the “naïve” forecast that would have been made by an investor who knew 
the mean trend drift of dividends and the required rate of return over the pre- 
World War I period, and nothing more. The price-dividend ratio shows almost no 
volatility in the pre-World War I period, and considerable volatility in the post- 
World War II period. The third line of table 1 shows the volatility of the log ex 
post perfect-foresight fundamental to dividend ratio (p* - d), about the same 
constant of twenty.
If prices are more volatile relative to “naïve” forecasts than perfect-foresight 
fundamentals, investors could and should have constructed a better forecast: a 
weighted average of the market price and the naïve forecast would have 
generated smaller forecast errors. Thus the second line of the table, the volatility 
of the price-dividend ratio, should under the efficient markets hypothesis be 
smaller than the third line, the volatility of ex post perfect-foresight 
fundamentals about the naïve constant dividend multiple forecast. Line four 
reports this volatility ratio.
Line five in table 1 calculates another volatility ratio. The volatility of the 
perfect-foresight fundamental about the actual price should be less than the 
volatility of the perfect-foresight fundamental about the naïve forecast. If this is 
not so, the actual price is a worse estimate of fundamentals than the naïve 
forecast.
A final implication of the efficient markets hypothesis is that the two ratios 
of lines four and five—the sum reported in line six—should add up to one. If not, 
the log difference between the price and the perfect-foresight fundamental (p - 
p*) is correlated with the log price-dividend ratio (p - d). Profits could have been 
earned by trading on this correlation of the price-dividend ratio and value 
relative to price. Lines seven and eight report monte carlo estimated significance 
levels for tests of the efficient markets hypothesis using the volatility ratio in 
line 6, assuming that log dividends follow either an IMA(1, 6) or an error 
correction model. These monte carlo significance levels are discussed at greater 
length below.
The bottom panel of table 1 reports analogous statistics for the United States 
stock market, for analogous periods.
Much of the excess volatility literature over the past decade has been 
concerned with the finite-sample distributions of volatility ratios like those in 




























































































volatility ratios are not strong evidence against it because test statistics have 
large tails under the efficient-markets null.
Believers in the efficient markets hypothesis have no need to resort to such 
defensive arguments in the case of pre-World War I Germany. Both the volatility 
ratios in lines four and five are less than one. The volatility ratios in lines 4 and 
5 for the pre-World War I period are smaller than on average under the null. 
Prices are not too volatile relative to dividends, they are insufficiently volatile. 
Prices are much less volatile than perfect-foresight fundamentals relative to the 
naive forecast. The market price is a better estimate of the perfect-foresight 
fundamental than is the naive constant dividend multiple forecast. Thus tests 
based on market volatility ratios show no traces at all of excess volatility in the 
German stock market before World War I.
The post-World War II German stock market does show volatility ratios in 
line 6 of table 1 greater than one, and thus might provide some evidence of 
excess volatility. Table 1 also reports monte carlo estimates of the finite-sample 
statistical significance of the volatility ratios reported in line 6. Significance 
levels are calculated for two sets of assumptions about the true process 
generating dividends: first, that the log level of dividends follows an IMA(1, 6) 
with coefficients known to investors; second, that the log level of dividends 
follows an error-correction model—in which each year brings a shock to the 
fundamental value of the market, and the market’s dividend level adjusts to 
close half of the gap between last year’s dividend and the current sustainable 
dividend/price ratio—set out in appendix 2.
The IMA(1, 6) process was chosen because its integrated component allows 
shocks to the level of dividends to persist permanently, yet its inclusion of six 
moving-average coefficients provides the monte carlo dividend process with 
sufficient flexibility to closely match the actual short-run dividend impulse 
response function. The error correction process (with its adjustment parameter 
0=0.5) was chosen because it was the process used by Mankiw, Romer, and 
Shapiro (1991), because it was used by Merton and Marsh (1986) in their 
critique of Shiller, and because it can, with sufficiently slow adjustment, 
generate very persistent shifts in rates of dividend growth close to those 





























































































The post-World War II period considered as a whole generates volatility 
ratios that are significant rejections of the null hypothesis on the high side for 
the two generating processes considered.16
There is a strong argument that the post-World War II Wirtschaftswunder 
decade of the 1950’s sees the German stock market following a different 
stochastic process than the later years of slower growth. When the post- 
Wirtschaftsw under 1960-90 period is considered in isolation, its volatility ratios 
are high enough to be very significant rejections of the null hypothesis.
As appendix 2 shows, the distributions of these test statistics are sensitively 
dependent on the assumed parameters of the generating process. Sufficient 
smoothness in the dividend level and instability in dividend growth, for example, 
can lead to high estimated volatility ratios even if the null efficient markets 
hypothesis holds. But shifting to a dividend generating process that possesses 
larger and more persistent changes in dividend growth does not make German 
data fit the efficient markets hypothesis more closely: the pre-World War I era 
would then exhibit deficient, not excess volatility.
There are surely dividend process that have a high probability of generating 
volatility ratios as large as those observed for the post -Wirtschaftswunder period. 
But for such a process, volatility ratios as low as those observed for the pre- 
World War I era are extraordinarily unlikely. Similarly, assuming a dividend 
process that generates volatility ratios as low as the values observed for the pre- 
World War I era would magnify the significance of the excess volatility of the 
post-Wirtschaftswunder era. Only under the assumption of a major shift from a 
dividend process nearly a random walk before World War I to a process with 
substantial dividend smoothing after World War II would there be any 
possibility of using the efficient markets hypothesis to account for the behavior 
in both periods—and there is no sign in dividend autocorrelations of such a 
major shift in the dividend process between the pre-World War I period and the 
post-1960 period.
16Appendix 2 considers additional generating processes. Nevertheless, the post-World War II era continues to 
show signs of excess volatility for all proposed generating processes save the error correction models with high 
values of 0. When 0 is near one, year-to-year dividend level changes are small and shifts in dividend growth 
rates are persistent. Accordingly, the variability of the price-dividend ratio is large: a value of 0=0.8 implies that 
each year dividends adjust only one-fifth of the way to the “permanent” sustainable dividend level. This is a 
greater degree of relative smoothness in real dividends vis-a-vis prices than is in fact found in the sample. A 
value of 0=0.1 implies that each year dividends adjust ninety percent of the way to the “permanent” dividend 
level: this makes the price-dividend ratio loo close to a constant to be consistent with the data. Appendix 2 also 






























































































The conclusions reached using the constant dividend multiple benchmark 
are not fragile. They do not depend sensitively on the choice of this particular 
naïve forecast benchmark against which to assess volatility. Shiller (1990) 
argues that the use of a constant multiple of a long moving average of dividends 
as a naïve forecast benchmark is preferable to the use of current dividends. In 
the U.S. dividends appear to have a substantial short-run mean-reverting 
component, and a long moving average of lagged dividends is a lower variance 
estimate of ex post fundamental values. Shiller (1990) finds stronger violations of 
volatility bounds using such a smoothed naïve forecast benchmark.
Table 2 presents volatility ratios using a ten-year moving average of lagged 
dividends as a benchmark. The substantive conclusions are unchanged: the post- 
World War II era shows some evidence of excess volatility, while the pre-World 
War I era shows no such evidence. Using the Shiller (1990) benchmark pre- 
World War I era German stock market indices no longer appear insufficiently 
volatile to be efficient market estimates of fundamentals, but the volatility ratios 
for the pre-World War I period are close to the center of the distributions 
calculated in the monte carlo simulations. As noted above, calculated 
significance levels should be regarded with suspicion, and used gingerly. 
Nevertheless, the sharp difference in the characteristics of the pre-World War I 





























































































Volatility Tests for the German Market Using a Moving Average of Lagged 
Dividends as the NaTve Forecast Benchmark
p °  a  1 0 -Y e a r  M o v in g  







Volatility of p-p'... 0.082 0.164 0.176
Volatility ot p-p°... 0.023 0.316 0.204
Volatility of p'-p°... 0.090 0.338 0.109
Volatility ratio: p-p° and p'-p°... 0.26 0.93 1.86
Volatility ratio: p-p’  and p‘ -p°... 0.91 0.49 1.59
Sum of ratios 1.17 1.42 3.45
Significance: IMA(1,6) 0.27 0.06 0.01
Significance: ECM (9=0.5) 0.38 0.08 0.01
Still other naive forecast benchmarks could be used. Few today would argue 
for Shiller’s (1981) original ex post time trend as an admissable naive forecast 
benchmark. But some might argue that the constant dividend multiple 
benchmarks themselves attribute to investors in the past knowledge that they 
did not in fact possess (see Barsky and De Long, 1989; Bulkley and Tonks, 1989). 
If the long-run growth rate of the economy, and of dividends, and if future real 
interest rates are not known with certainty, how then could past investors 
calculate the appropriate multiple by which to mark up current dividends? 
Bulkley and Tonks (1989) argued that apparent violations of volatility bounds on 
the post-World War I London market did not exist in fact once it was recognized 
that investors had to estimate the parameters of the dividend process, and did 
not know them ex ante.
Such arguments, however, tend to explain away apparent excess volatility 
where it appears: they would, if anything, make the existence of deficient 




























































































IV. The GroUbanken and the Stock Market
Explanations of the difference between the behavior of the pre-World War I 
and the post-World War II German stock market can take two roads. First, 
perhaps there is a sharp contrast between the processes generating dividends in 
the pre-World War I and post-World War II eras. Second, perhaps the 
institutions of the pre-World War I German stock market led it to have market 
prices that were better forecasts of fundamentals.
Unstable Growth Rates
If the post-World War II dividend process was significantly different from 
the pre-World war I process, the cause was presumably World War II. In the 
war’s immediate aftermath was not clear to what degree the German economy 
would recover from the war, or what its long-run growth rate would be after the 
initial spurt of reconstruction had passed. The pace and the duration of the 
Wirtschaftswunder were unknown to contemporary investors. The lack of 
knowledge of the likely pace and duration of the spurt of post-World War II 
“super growth,” or of the subsequent likely growth rate of the German economy 
meant that investors could not calculate the mean ratio of fundamental values to 
dividends, and so could not form the “naive” forecast that table 1 implicitly 
assumes that they possessed.
This line of argument runs into potential difficulties. The pre-World War I 
German stock market lacks excess volatility. But Germany was then undergoing 
its industrial revolution (Clapham, 1963; Landes, 1969). It appears equally 
plausible to argue that the long-run growth rate of the economy and thus the 
mean price-dividend ratio then in the pre-World War I era was unknown, a 
changing parameter that investors learned only ex post and not a given that they 
could use ex ante to construct forecasts. Yet pre-World War I investors appear to 
have been very confident of the long-run growth rate of corporations, and so kept 
price-dividend ratios within a very narrow range.
Moreover, the U.S. stock market has exhibited stronger signs of excess 
volatility than the German, without the excuse of defeat in war and wartime 
destruction to add instability to the process generating dividends. This line of 
argument would explain a deviation of the behavior of the post-World War II 
German market from standard experience. It does not account for the deviation 
of the behavior of the pre-World War I German market from other experience 
that we actually see.17 Unstable and unknown trend divdiend growth rates may




























































































well have been a cause of high post-World Wa rll variability, but it cannot be the 
sole major cause of the contrast between pre-World War I and post-World War II 
behavior.
The Role of the Gropbanken
This section points to the role played by the German Gropbanken in issuing, 
analyzing, making a market for, and supporting the prices of German securities 
in the years before World War I. It speculates that their key position in the 
German economy is linked to the absence of excess volatility. The GroPbanken 
dominated pre-World War I financial markets in Germany.18 They had well- 
developed analytical abilities, strong views regarding the proper levels of stock 
prices, and an incentive to moderate fluctuations away from fundamentals.
In the middle of the nineteenth century continental Europe lacked the 
network of banking financial intermediaries found in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Prevailing banking theory in Britain and the United States held that banks 
existed primarily to provide liquidity, that their assets should ideally liquidate 
themselves in a short period of time, and assets not self-liquidating should be 
held only if they were secured by assets that were themselves liquid and safe 
(Willis and Bogen, 1936). There was thus a sharp division of labor between 
commercial banks—which provided transactions services and liquidity—and 
investment banks, which underwrote the sale and distribution of claims to the 
capital committed to the rapidly-growing corporate sector.
In continental Europe things were different (Landes 1956). German stock 
markets, especially, were not well developed and were illiquid. The 
fragmentation of the country meant that pre-1870 Germany had many securities 
markets, none of which possessed large volume or large supplies of capital (Pohl, 
1976, 1982a, 1982b). The lack of well-developed and liquid bond and stock 
market made it harder for firms to raise money through the sale of securities, 
and harder for investment banks to conduct their business as short-term 
intermediaries only.
“Mixed” banks filled the gap. The growing need for external finance by 
industry and the absence of well-developed securities markets on which to raise 
money created a niche that the German “mixed” banks were to fill 
(Gerschenkron, 1952). The first true “mixed” bank in Germany—a dual
Barsky and De Long (1989,1990).
18They are still influential in the German economy today, although not nearly as important as they were before 
World War I, when leading social democrat Rudolf Hilferding (1910) could say that all that was needed in order 




























































































commercial and investment bank, that not only accepted deposits and made 
short-term loans but also provided long-term capital financing for corporations— 
was the A. Schaaffhausen’scher Bankverein. Its main business activities were 
savings- and checking accounts, intra-German “foreign” exchange (for Germany 
did not yet have a uniform currency), the provision of short-term trade credit, 
and “stakes in industrial enterprises”—an item that features with Taler 375,000 
in its 1848 balance sheet. These banks were investment trusts, development 
banks, commercial banks, investment banks, securities underwriters, 
investment advisors, and management consultants all at once (Weber, 1902; 
Riesser, 1911; Quittner, 1929; Neuberger, 1974).
By 1880 the banks had representatives on most industrial boards—contacts 
that could be used very profitably when deciding on the methods of corporate 
finance. The commitment of large proportions of their banks’ capital to illiquid 
long-term industrial, transportation, and utility investments created obvious 
risks. Where British bankers needed only to fear that the collateral pledged for 
loans was of low quality, German bankers had to worry about the solvency of the 
firms in which they had invested. Potential profits from making long-term 
capital commitments to growing and capital-hungry German industry were too 
large to pass up, but bankers required means to gather information and insisted 
on some degree of control to try to limit their risk.19
One way to limit risk was to use leverage to influence corporations. Wilhelm 
von Siemens, Chairman of Siemens and Halske (the second-largest German 
electrical machinery manufacturing company) describes his negotiations with 
the Deutsche Bank during a credit crunch as follows:
...I was urgently requested to come to the Deutsche 
Bank...the entire D ire k tio n ... was gathered  
there....Herr [Arthur von] Gwinner judged that 
[Siemens and Halske] needed 5 or 6 million [marks]. It 
was not possible to issue shares or bonds, and under 
no circum stances [would] ...the D eutsche 
Bank...advance us the money....My comments [that 
the firm was well capitalized] were received with great 
skepticism20... my family was required to obligate 
itself...to lend the firm its last dividend...21
19Neuberger (1974) cites Riesser (1911) as counting 819 representatives of the eight leading Grofibanken on the 
boards of directors of German corporations in 1905.
20Wilhelm von Siemens is likely to have known little if anything more about Siemens and Halske’s position 
than the men he was negotiating with. The Deutsche Bank’s point men in the negotiation were Arthur von 
Gwinner, sometime director of Siemens and Halske, and Wilhelm’s cousin Georg von Siemens. Later on the 
manager of one of Siemens’ subsidiaries—the Siemens-Schuckert Company—would successfully appeal to the 
Deutsche Bank to protect him from the interference of his supposed superior Wilhelm von Siemens, chairman 
of the Siemens and Halske board.




























































































The implicit threat the Deutsche Bank used to persuade the Siemens family to 
provide high-risk “mezzanine” financing and commit an even greater share of the 
family’s wealth to the family firm is clear: Deutsche Bank approval is necessary 
if the Siemens family wishes to continue to run the business (Neuberger, 1974).
The Grofibanken had the power to carry out whatever threats they might 
make to or conditions they might lay down for corporation managers.Their 
organizations controlled a large part of the voting stock—and a still larger part 
of the stock voted. Banks voted the shares held in their own names. Through the 
institution of the Depotstimmrecht, banks also voted the shares of others. 
Investors would use the banks as brokerage houses, leaving their certificates in 
safe custody with the bank. In such a case, the bank would write and ask if the 
shareholder was planning to attend the annual meeting. If not, the bank would 
be very happy to vote the shares and so look after the shareholder’s interest.22 A 
bank like the Deutsche, owning perhaps five percent for its own account and 
voting an additional twenty percent through the Depotstimmrecht, might well 
have an absolute majority of shares voted.23
The key to the profitability of the Grofibanken lay in its ability to securitize 
its credit commitments, and to place the bonds and shares of the corporations it 
sponsored at high prices. Successful “mixed” banks persuaded investors that the 
companies they sponsored were desirable investments. To please investors, 
banks sought to sell shares that would remain stable both in their yield relative 
to par and in their market value (Prion, 1910). To please firms, banks sought to 
get a “good price” for their capital issues. Furthermore, the quicker a bank could 
securitize its commitments and recover its capital from an issue transaction, the 
better: after 1880 the German capital market was so large relative to the capital 
of even the largest banks that none of them wished to have a large risk like a 
new issue on its books for too long (Riesser, 1906, 1911).
The Groflbanken thus sought to enhance their “issue credit,” defined by 
Riesser (1906, 1911) as their reputation as honest brokers selling sound 
securities, who would monitor corporations to protect both their own 
investments and the investments of those who had bought on the bank’s 
recommendation. Riesser describes the connection between a company and a 
bank that was established by the bank’s once underwriting a firm’s security
22The Depotstimmrecht was and is the subject of economic, political and legal debates. For a good account of 
the legal situation before the hyperinflation, see Gieske (1926).
23The role played by the Grofibanken in issuing securities assisted them in their collection of shareholders’ 
proxies. When a corporation issued new shares, existing shareholders had a Bezugsrechte claim—the right to 
purchase shares at less than the current market price in order to avoid involuntary dilution of their equity. To 
exercise this right they had to reveal their identity to the film’s bank. Passow (1922) argues that the German 
banks knew more about the composition and location of shareholdings than anyone else: more than private 




























































































issue as so strong that:
...they are thereafter joined ‘for better or 
worse’....[T]his connection finds further expression in 
the appointment of members of the bank directorate to 
the supervisory council of the industrial 
enterprises...caused by the necessity for the banks to 
maintain the influence [over the firm] which they have 
gained through the issue...[and] by a regard for their 
issue credit, which makes it the duty of the bank...to 
retain...[supervisory] control.24
The Grofibanken and the Stock Market
Even if ultimate investors are confident that the Groflbank promoting a 
firm’s securities will monitor it to ensure that it remains well-managed and 
profitable, they will not necessarily regard such securities as safe investments. 
Investors care not just about the present value of the income stream they would 
receive if they held the security permanently, but also about liquidity. If they 
have to sell, will they get a fair price? For investors with uncertain horizons and 
liquidity demands to count a bank-sponsored security as safe, the bank must 
take steps to ensure both that its fundamentals are and remain sound and that 
its market price will not fluctuate relative to fundamentals.
Thus the Grofibanken, trying to create value for the investors to whom they 
sold newly-issued securities, sought also to support the prices of the securities 
they issued. Riesser states that sponsoring firms are “...not merely justified but 
positively... bound, by the requirement [that they take the] ‘care of an ordinary 
issuing firm,” to support the market prices of securities. According to Riesser, 
this support is “not...an attempt to produce an artificial rise of quotations, or to 
effect their artificial ‘regulation’” to swindle the public. Instead “it is...a service 
to investors by making sure that their securities do not artificially lose value 
because of... speculators [who],..depress the market value...while there maybe 
no intrinsic reason for a decline.”
Did the Grojibanken have sufficient resources to keep asset prices close to 
their own internal estimates of fundamentals? The Grofibanken were by far the 
largest actors in the German economy. The banks shaped their underwriting and 
issuing strategies with an eye toward long-term support of share prices: they
24Riesser’s view is a banker’s-eye view, and downplays possible desires of founders and managers of operating 
companies to retain their practical independence. On pages 367-8 of Riesser (1911), he does say that “this form 
of ‘friendly’ relations through the filling of positions on the supervisory board, it must be confessed, was 
sometimes effected only after considerable unpleasant argument.. .for instance, when the Dresdner Bank gained 




























































































tried hard in securities issues to place bonds and stocks in the hands of investors 
who would hold them and not immediately turn them back onto the market.
Some, like social democratic politician and future Weimar Republic finance 
minister Rudolf Hilferding (1910), believed that “finance capital” did dominate 
the stock market, and faced few limits in its manipulation of share prices. 
Hilferding believed that banks “as a result of their increasingly close relations 
with industry...have an intimate knowledge of the situation of particular 
enterprises...[and so] carry on their [stock market] speculations with 
considerable security” because of their important informational edge. Hilferding 
believed that the stock markets had become registers of banks’ opinions of share 
values, for “a large bank represents in itself a volume of supply and demand [for 
securities] such as was previously represented only by one of the larger stock 
exchanges.”25 He quotes the Frankfurter Zeitung of 21 June 1907 as arguing that 
banks did not need to trade but only to announce their assessments of 
fundamentals to move prices. Speculators had such regard for banks’ superior 
analytical capabilities and inside information that, for example, “the...impetus to 
the sudden collapse of security prices” the previous spring had been given by “an 
unfavorable forecast of business conditions by one of the big banks.”
Riesser, by contrast protested that Grofibanken support of prices was limited 
in scope. But he is more concerned with arguing that it was exercised in a good 
cause than that it was unimportant. While Riesser discusses the emissions 
process and the influence of banks on corporate managers extensively, he spends 
little space discussing the “maintenance” of prices on already-issued securities.26
Still others, like Prion (1910, 1929), claim that all important shares had 
patrons in the form of analysts at the banks. According to Prion, every day 
representative of the bank would meet with the exchange’s market maker “zur 
Kurfestsetzung“—to set the price.27 Prion argues as well that the banks 
determined prices not because they possessed the capital to peg them directly, 
but because they were seen as informed investors and made the best estimates of 
the underlying “innerer Wert.”28 If the Deutsche Bank—known to have the most 
comprehensive network of analysts in Germany, and correctly believed to have
^Hilferding, quoting the 1905 Berliner Jahrbuch fur Handel und Industrie.
26He does say that economic prosperity depends on having a “thick” stock market, in which panics do not lead 
to waves of selling that overwhelm stabilizing speculation by banks and others. Riesser believes that if stock 
market values were not relatively stable, then it would be difficult to induce investors to purchase new issues on 
terms that corporations would be willing to offer.
77According to Prion (1910), this “was common knowledge in stock exchange circles...[though] hardly known 
to the general public; this manifests itself in the surprise shown by A. Wagner...[who, when he discovered the 
extent of] the regulation of Pfandbriefe by the Pfandbriefbanken.. .condemned [it] as cancer."
^ “Fundamental value” in very free translation. The “permanent” dividend that a company pays out discounted 




























































































inside information as well—decides that a company should be quoted lower, who 
will take the other side of the trade it offers?29
Are these observations of pre-World War I financiers and academic students 
of finance trustworthy? Riesser was an “insider,” an executive of the Bank fur 
Handel und Industrie. His volume on German banking was the single study of 
German finance that the U.S. National Monetary Commission translated in 
order to help it wrestle with the issues involved in trying to design a central 
bank for the United States. Prion was perhaps the leading academic student of 
finance at the time—he was the one commissioned to write the article 
“Borsenwesen” [literally: “the nature of the exchange”] for the authoritative 
Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften [Dictionary of the Policy Sciences]. 
Hilferding was one of the intellectual and political leaders of the social 
democratic movement. Moreover, their views of turn of the century German 
finance are consistent with those of present-day historians like Pohl (1982).
The fact that the heyday of “finance capitalism” in pre-World War I Germany 
sees the absence of excess volatility is food for thought. Historians of corporate 
development like Chandler (1990) argue that organizations like the Deutsche 
Bank were well informed. Perhaps they did make better estimates of 
fundamentals than the speculators who would have dominated the stock market 
in their absence, who did dominate the American stock market throughout the 
past century, and who have played a more active role in the German stock 
market since World War II.
This hypothesis is itself speculation, and is not based on solid or inside 
knowledge. However, the strength of the Gropbanken is an important 
institutional feature of the structure of the pre-World War I German stock 
market. The absence of excess volatility is an unusual feature of market 
performance. Perhaps the two are intimately linked.30
29According to Prion (1910), bankers explicitly calculated the “innerer Wert" of shares by considering shares as 
a claim on the income stream of the corporation. Prion quotes discount rates of 1-1.5% above the interbank rate 
to capitalize dividends paid by bank shares and 1.5-2% above the interbank rate for mining and steel shares, and 
argues that banks’ assessments of stock market values are based on their estimates of the permanent level of 
dividends, not the current level. (Prion also notes that such fundamental-value calculations are complicated by 
considerations of the liquidation value of the firm’s capital in the event of bankruptcy.)
A focus of Donner’s (1934) paper that is our principal source for pre-World War I data was to see whether 
the observed variability of pre-WWI stock prices could be explained by variation in the “innerer Wert” that 
Prion believed the banks used to assess fundamentals. Following Donner’s example, we find that Prion’s 
formula could account for 84 percent of the variation in nominal stock index prices over 1870-1913, and 
concluded that the quantitative time series confirmed the theory of price formation that Prion had arrived at 
through his study of the institutions and operating procedures of the stock exchange. We believe that Donner 
underestimated the extent to which pre-World War I data fit Prion’s model: Donner used the current dividend 
rather than an estimate of the permanent dividend in his regression, and in the pre-World War I German stock 
market a low price-dividend ratio is a good forecaster of future declines in real dividends.
30Even if the dominance of the Grofibanken led the pre-World War I German stock market to be a better social 
calculating mechanism for determining the net value of new investment, their dominance may well have had 





























































































This paper has used German data to investigate issues similar to those that 
Shiller (1989) has investigated in his studies of the United States stock market. 
The German data give different answers. There is some evidence of excess 
volatility in the post-World War II German stock market. But there is no sign at 
all of excess volatility in the pre-World War I German stock market. Relative to 
a naive forecast benchmark that takes fundamental values to be a constant 
multiple of dividends, the pre-World War I German stock market stands in 
contrast to both the post-World War II German market, and to the American 
market in either the pre-World War I or the post-World War II period.
The substantive results of this paper suggest two additional lines of thought. 
The first is that in a sense the absence of excess volatility in the German stock 
market before World War I strengthens Shiller’s conclusions for the United 
States. It is harder to maintain that Shiller’s findings of violations of market 
efficiency are due primarily to biases in test procedures or to inappropriate 
assumptions about the stochastic character of generating processes when the 
pre-World War I German stock market—presumably subject to the same biases 
in test procedures —exhibits no signs of excess volatility. The U.S. stock market 
might have exhibited as low a degree of volatility relative to current dividends 
and perfect-foresight fundamentals as the pre-World War I German market. Yet 
it did not do so. This calls for explanation.
The second is that perhaps the unusual behavior of the pre-World War I 
German market—in not showing evidence of excess volatility—is linked to the 
institutional structure of finance under the German Empire. Perhaps the 
investors who were active at the margin in the pre-World War I German market 
were the well-informed Gropbanken, which both formed good estimates of 
fundamental values and had an interest derived from their investment banking 
business in moderating swings of stock prices away from fundamentals.
This speculative possibility is intriguing. It suggests that a competitive stock 
market, in which prices balance the momentary demands and supplies of short­
term traders who are relatively uninformed about fundamentals, may not 
perform as well—measured as a social calculating and capital allocation 
mechanism—as alternative institutional arrangements that rely more on 
“hierarchy” and less on “market exchange.” If market performance is evaluated 
using a metric that penalizes “excess volatility,” then the pre-World War I 
German stock market appears to have performed relatively well. Perhaps its
under some interpretations they played a substantial role in the “marriage of iron and rye” that gave Germany 




























































































“finance capitalist” structure had something to do with its good performance.
Cochrane (1991) asks believers in Shiller’s (1989) arguments for “excess 
volatility” to suggest an alternative form of organizing securities markets that 
would produce better forecasts of fundamental values. He implies that there is 
no alternative, that a competitive market populated by atomistic, short-horizon 
speculators like the one the U.S. has possessed for the past century is the best 
option. If flawed forecasts are the cause of excess volatility, how could different 
institutions be immune to such flawed forecasts? The pre-World War I German 
hypothesis suggests a possible answer. Perhaps a U.S. stock market dominated 
by informed Groflbanken would have been a better social capital allocation 
mechanism than the actual U.S. market has been over the past century. The 
absence of excess volatility in the pre-World War I German market indicates 




























































































Appendix 1: Underlying Data
Pre-World War I Indices
There are five different stock price indices available for the pre-World War I 
German stock market.
The index that covers the earliest time period is that of Dâbritz, reprinted in 
Donner (1934). From 1925 on, Dâbritz was the director of the Institut für 
Konjunkturforschung “West” in Cologne. As part of his business cycle research 
program, he calculated ratios of share value to registered capital over the period 
1856-1870 for a relatively small number of publicly-traded companies.
There are two major shortcomings in Dâbritz’s index from our perspective. 
The first is that it is not a portfolio index at all. Instead, Dàbritz’s index is an 
average of ratios of market to par value for the corporations in the index. This 
means, first, that changes in the index are not capital gains or losses on a 
portfolio: the index value jumps when a new stock is added or an old stock 
dropped from the sample. Second, Dâbritz did not collect any index of the 
dividends paid or the average yield on the stocks that make up his index.
The first of the pre-World War I indices ranked by the date of its composition 
is that of Dermietzel (1906). Dermietzel sought to advance the literature on the 
determinants of corporate profitability that had been started by Kôrôsy (1901). 
He collected company specific dividend and share price statistics for German 
corporations between 1876 and 1902. Dermietzel (1906) himself, following his 
model Kôrosy, reports as his primary statistic the absolute value of all shares of 
all companies on the exchange. Dermietzel also reports the par values of the 
companies’ registered capital, and so his index can be converted into an index of 
price relative to par value of a definition similar to that of Dâbritz.
The Dermietzel index covered a very large sample of more than one hundred 
companies by the end of the nineteenth century. Even at its beginning in 1876, it 
still covered more than forty companies.
A slightly later study by Albert (1910) contains yet a third index, once more 
not a “portfolio” index but instead a ratio of market to par values. Albert’s index 
is an average of individual stock price series for eleven companies over the 




























































































Albert’s series is itself derivative. He compiled his tables from two sources. 
From 1895-1899 he averaged monthly numbers in Neumann’s share price tables 
for the Berlin exchange. From 1900-1908 he used Conrad’s article 
“V olkswirtschaftliche Chronik” in the H andw orterbuch  der 
Staatswissenschaften.31
The first of the true portfolio indices ranked by date of composition was 
constructed by Wagemann and published in the Wochenberichte of his Institut 
fur Konjunkturforschung in 1929. He was the founder (in 1925) of the Berlin 
Institut fur Konjunkturforschung—a different “Institute for Business Cycle 
Research” than the Institut filr Konjunkturforschung “West” of which Dabritz 
was head. Dabritz’s institute was a largely independent but formally subsidiary 
branch of Wagemann’s. Wagemann’s organization was a Berlin-based non-profit, 
“free think-tank” for business cycle research. It was supported by the Weimar 
Republic’s ministries and by private industry. It shared many of its personnel 
with the National Statistical Bureau, the Statistisches Reichsamt.32 Wagemann’s 
principal interest, however, was not so much in tracking the stock market as in 
capturing short-run fluctuations that would be useful for predicting the course of 
the business cycle.
The second of the true portfolio indices is that of Donner (1934). Donner 
(1934) is certainly the most ambitious German contribution to the international 
debate on the causes of stock market fluctuations that sprang up after the 1929 
crash. He seeks to determine the economic causes of German stock market 
fluctuations, thus following the track of Prion (1929). Donner put together a 
monthly index covering the period from January 1870 to December 1913 by 
taking averages weighted by their market capitalizations of stock price changes. 
His work was published by Wagemann in the Quarterly Supplements to the 
reports of his Institut filr Konjunkturforschung.
Donner takes pains to purge his index of the effects of new share issues, and 
of the inclusion and exclusion of companies. Donner excludes from his 
calculations of month-to-month price changes any company that issues new
51 The companies in Albert’s sample are the Gelsenkirchener Bergbau, Harpener Bergbau (coal), Bochumer 
GuBstahl, KOnigs- und LaurahCitte (steel), Berliner Maschinen bau Gesellschaft (machinery), Hamburg- 
Amerika Paket Fracht, Norddeutscher Lloyd (shipping), Stettiner Vulkan (shipbuilding), the Deutsche Bank, 
and the Diskonto Kommandite Gesellschaft (banking).
32Wagemann compares his Institut fur Konjunkturforschung with similar institutions in the United States—like 
the Harvard Economic Service, Wesley Clair Mitchell’s National Bureau of Economic Research, the Institute of 
Economics in Washington (a piece of what was to become Brookings), and the Russian “Business Cycle 
Service” run by Kondratieff before his arrest and execution under Stalin. Unlike the Americans, whom 
Wagemann characterized as “engineers,” or the Russians, whom he called “astronomers,” the Germans were 
supposed to follow an “organic-biological” methodology for research and forecasting—collecting and reporting 




























































































shares (and, more likely than not, offers them at below market values to existing 
shareholders), is added to the index, or drops out of the index.
Donner’s indices are superior to those of his contemporaries both from the 
point of view of coverage and from the point of view of the sophistication of their 
construction. The earlier indices compiled by Albert and others were simple 
calculations of the total market value of shares or of averages of share prices 
across companies.33 Unlike Donner (1934), their indices made no attempt to 
correct for new issues of stock, or for the entry of new firms into the sample. 
Donner (1934) assembles period-to-period price changes for his index by taking 
the weighted average of price changes for firms that are quoted in both periods 
and do not issue any new shares.34
Donner’s index covers only twelve companies from 1870 to 1875. The number 
of companies covered rises over time, reaching twenty-one by 1876 and nearly 
sixty by 1890. This rise in the number of companies proceeds alongside a shift 
mix of industries represented. The original twelve companies covered in 1870 
include four banks, four railroads, and four mining companies.35 Railroads 
disappear from the index with their nationalization in 1890. Companies in other 
industries are added as the industrialization of Germany proceeds.36 Especially 
in the years from 1890 on, the Donner index is a cross section of Germany’s 
largest companies, weighted toward the heavy industries in which Germany’s 
companies were largest and its international comparative advantage greatest.
Alongside his stock price index Donner reports a yield index for his sample. 
His yield index is available only on an annual basis: Donner believed that 
examining dividends at any frequency finer than an annual one ran the 
unacceptable risk of conflating real shifts in payout rates with shifts induced by 
changes in the timing of payments.
33German securities laws required that all shares of stock have a par value of 100 marks. Averages of stock
prices are thus averages of nominal prices relative to par values as well.
-Such a procedure is potentially subject to a different bias because firms that go bankrupt and exit the sample 
will be omitted. But the only firms that exit Donner’s sample are the German railroads. Donner makes a special 
correction for these railroads, which exit the sample not because of bankruptcy but because of nationalization. 
’-Two of the mining companies—the Bochumer Vcrein fur Bergbau and GuBstahlfabrik and the Hoerder 
Bergwerks- und HUttenverein—also had metal fabrication or railway divisions.
:i6On the eve of World War I, the index covers eight banks, two shipping companies, fourteen mining and steel 
producers, four electrical machinery manufacturers, four utilities, nine metalworking manufacturers, six in 
chemicals, seven in textiles, two in paper and wood products, three makers of building materials, two 





























































































Pre-World War I German Stock Price Indices Available
Figure A.l graphs the nominal values of the five stock price indices available 
for the pre-World War I era. As can be readily seen, they track each other 
relatively closely. Especially after 1876—when Donner’s index consists of more 
than twenty and Dermietzel’s index of more than forty companies—it is possible 
to be confident that the indices do capture fluctuations in the German market. 
Before 1876 it is not so clear that this is the case, and dividend indices are not 
available before 1870. Thus the empirical work in the body of the paper begins in 
1876.
Figure A.2 plots Donner’s annual dividend yield series for the pre-World War 
I period. As noted above, dividend yield fluctuations are contained within a 





























































































Donner Dividend Yield Series
Interwar Series
Dormer’s index ends on the eve of World War I. During the interwar period 
the Statistisches Reichsamt (National Bureau of Statistics), the official statistical 
bureau of first the democratic Weimar Republic and then the Third Reich, 
constructed a portfolio-based index covering the period from 1914 up to the 
1923-24 hyperinflation. Its construction is outlined in the official Wirtschaft und 
Statistik (see Statistisches Reichsamt, 1922a, 1922b). This is the first, official 
stock market index for Germany.
The Reichsamt sought an indicator that would allow “first, to measure stock 
market trends in terms of some average, second, to show the effect of inflation on 
stock market prices” (1922a:168). A three-page article describes the index, 
constructed by averaging the prices of 300 companies, with weights 
corresponding to December 1913.
This first Reichsamt index is of the Laspeyres type. Its weights are derived 
from the registered capital of all German corporations, including those not 
traded on the stock exchange. The companies are divided into 33 industrial 
groups, the industry average is then calculated as an arithmetic average of share 
prices, and the market average is then calculated as a weighted average of the 
industry averages. This index takes account of Bezugsrechte—the preferential 
right of existing shareholders to purchase new share issues on favorable terms.37




























































































In 1928, the previous stock market index was revised: the distortions of the 
hyperinflation, the related change from Mark to Reichsmark, shifts in the 
industry composition of the corporate sector, and the desire by the official 
statisticians to slightly change their methodology (Statistisches Reichsamt 1928, 
1929) all served as reasons to replace the first interwar index.
The replacement index—the second Reichsamt index—covers 329 share 
titles, and takes the average price between 1924 and 1926 as its basis. Once 
again the weighting across industries uses the registered capital of all 
corporations as of the end of December 1926, including those companies not 
traded on the exchange. Companies are classified into 24 industrial groups.
The 24 industry averages were grouped into three intermediate indices and 
the final index. The index excludes price movements induced by new share 
issues—thus the Reichsamt II index is also a portfolio index, using the same 
procedure as Donner (1934) to take account of new share issues, and changes in 
the sample. Bundesbank (1976) and the Wochenberichte’s statistical supplements 
published by the Institut fiir Konjunkturforschung conveniently summarize the 
time series of values reported for this index.
The two interwar series can be linked, and in the body of the paper we do 
link them, to provide an estimate of real capital gains across the hyperinflation 
era, but we do not have great confidence in the reliability of the link. Real values 
of the indices across the interwar period are presented in figure A.3. Because of 
the hyperinflation, it makes no sense to plot nominal stock prices for the 
interwar period.





























































































Real Interwar Stock Price Series 
HReal Reichsamt I Index (1914=100) +  Real Reichsamt II Index (Chained: 1914=100)
Alternative indices of the ratios of book to par value are also available for the 
interwar period. They behave very differently from the portfolio indices 
calculated by the Reichsamt. The market-wide ratio of market to par values rises 
steeply in the early years of the Depression, reaching a peak in 1931: companies 
fail, and their subsequent omission from the index leaves only companies with 
high ratios of market to par value in the sample.
For the post-hyperinflation portion of the interwar period, the available yield 
series is the yield on all traded stocks, plotted in figure A.4.38 This yield series is 
reported in the Aktiengesellschaftsstatistik—the statistics of corporations, 
computed to track corporation profits and performance, which contains other 
measures of profitability as well—as well as in the Bôrsenstatistik—the statistics 
of financial markets, computed to track relative asset values, which contains the 
price indices. The diverging orientation of these two bodies of statistics means 
that the different series are not built on consistent bases: while the Reichsamt 
took pains to make sure that its stock price index did represent the value of a 
broad-based portfolio, it thought it more important that its dividend index have 
comprehensive coverage than that it correspond to the stock price index. Thus 
the yield statistics are calculated from a different sample of corporations than 
are the price indices.




























































































In the interwar period, this is extremely hazardous. Since the ratio of 
market to par value for all traded corporations does not track movements in the 
market portfolio, why should the dividend yield for all traded corporations track 
movements in the yield on the market portfolio?
The interwar yield index should therefore be used with caution. 
Nevertheless, it is reassuring to note that it is procyclical. If it were 
countercyclical—if yields rose during economic recessions and fell during 
economic booms—this would raise the possibility that low-yield companies were 
going bankrupt with high probability in the recession. If such low-yield 
companies in the market as a whole went bankrupt and disappeared from the 
stock market either more or less frequently than did companies in the index, 
then considerable inaccuracies would be sure to result.
Figure A.4
Interwar Dividend Yields
Note that there is no dividend series available for the time spanned by the 
first Reichsamt index.
Post-World War II Series
For the post-World War II period, the stock price series is constructed by 
linking official portfolio index series constructed by the Statistisch.es Bundesamt 




























































































War II West German Bundesrepublik. Three different portfolio indices are 
chained together, shifting from each one to the next in the first year in which the 
following sequence becomes available (see Herrmann, 1956; Spellerberg and 
Schneider, 1967; Silbermann, 1974; Liitzel and Jung, 1984; Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 1985).
The Bundesamt fur Statistik began to publish its first new index of stock 
values for the Federal Republic of Germany in 1956 (see Herrmann, 1956)—but 
note that this index is not used in the construction of our data, as its 
replacement covers its complete sample period as well. The index begins in 1953, 
and uses 430 share titles with a registered capital of 9516.4 million DM. Prices 
are recorded four times a month.
The 1953 index weights the share prices of corporations in a given industry 
traded on the exchange by the registered capital of all corporations. Herrmann 
(1956) claims that the alternative procedure—-weighting by market 
capitalization—would have discriminated against some industrial sectors, like 
the energy industry, underrepresented on the exchange.
The index is also adjusted for the lower share prices associated with new 
share issues in the same way as Donner (1934) and the interwar indices.
This index was replaced in 1967 (Spellerberg, Schneider 1967) by a new 
portfolio index using the end of 1965 as a base. This second post-World War II 
portfolio index covers 545 ordinary share titles, with a registered capital of 23.05 
billion DM. As before, the index is adjusted for new share issues.
The 1953 “portfolio” was considered out of date for several reasons. First, in 
the twelve years from 1954 to 1965 the registered capital on the stock exchange 
had risen by 12.7 billion DM. Thus the previous index covered only some forty 
percent of the registered capital. Different industry groups had raised capital at 
different rates.
In addition, the new index introduced three important computational 
changes. First, the classification of industrial groups was revised according to 
the 1961 “Systematik der Wirtschaftszweige.” Second, companies registered in 
West Berlin were included. Third, industry groups were once again weighted by 
the capital of corporations traded on the stock exchange—not by the capital of all 
corporations in the industry.
In 1965, a total of 627 titles with a capital of 23.88 billion DM were 
registered on the German exchanges. The share price index represents 94.6% of 




























































































issues and changes in coverage.
This index was in its turn replaced by a new revised index in 1972. The 1972 
revision was straightforward. The third portfolio index has the base date 29 
December 1972, comprises 285 titles with a registered capital of 27.88 billion 
DM, and represents 96.4% of the total registered capital. In addition to 
correcting for Bezugsrechte (preference rights), it also adjusts for Ausgabe von 
Berichtigungsaktien (issues of correction shares) and for mergers.
Figure A.5
Post-World War II Nominal Stock Prices
•Bundesamt (1965=100) +  Bundesamt (1972=100) XBundesamt (1980=100)
▲  FAZ-Index
Silbermann (1972) gives a detailed account of the computational procedures 
which, presumably, also apply to the 1953 and 1965 indices. The index is 
constructed in three stages. The first is the construction of unweighted industry 
group price averages. The second stage is the computation of sub-indices for 
“main industry groups” (Hauptwirtschaftsgruppe), weighting individual industry 
indices by the registered capital of all share titles traded on the exchange, 
including those not contained in the share price index. The third stage is the 
construction of the general index from the Hauptgruppenindex. using the same 
procedure used to construct the Hauptgruppenindex from the industry averages.
The most recent portfolio index was introduced by Liitzel and Jung (1984). It 
is based on 295 shares with a registered capital of 37595 billion DM. It 
represents 95.2% of the registered capital that year, 39501 billion DM. Note, 
however, that this index is not a Laspeyres index but a chain index. The portfolio 




























































































The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) index (graciously provided by the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) can also be used to track the rapid Korean-War 
era rise in German stock values. Even though the FAZ index is available for the 
entire post-World War II period, we prefer the sequence of overlapping 
Bundesamt portfolio indices because the FAZ index is a Paasche index. It is 
difficult to interpret its movements as the movements of a broad-based portfolio.
The nominal values of the post-World War II German stock market indices 
are plotted alongside each other in figure A.5. Once again, the series move 
together strongly.
For the post-World War II as well as for the interwar period, the available 
yield series used is the yield on all traded stocks—not the yield on all stocks 
covered in  the index.39 This yield series is reported in the 
Aktiengesellschaftsstatistik—the statistics of corporations, computed to track 
corporation profits and performance, which contains other measures of 
profitability as well. The diverging orientation of the Aktiengesellschaftsstatistik 
has the unfortunate consequence that the yield statistics are calculated from a 
different sample of corporations than are the price indices.
Nevertheless, the post-World War II dividend series—calculated by 
multiplying price times yield—is a good approximation to the true dividend 
series that would correspond to the price index series we use. The post-World 
War II price index series covers close to ninety-five percent of the par value of 
stocks traded on the German exchanges. The approximation error could become 
significant only if the uncovered five percent of stocks had truly extraordinary 
dividend payout patterns. This is especially unlikely because the index sample 
was chosen to provide a good approximation to the size and industry distribution 
of the German corporate sector.
Figure A.6 plots the post-World War II yield series. Its variability is far, far 
greater than the variability of the pre-World War I yield series plotted in figure
A.2. While pre-World War I market average dividend yields varied between four 
and six percent, post-World War II yields vary between one and six percent—and 
even post-Wirtschaftsuiunder yields vary between two and six percent.





























































































Post-World War II Yield Series
Year
Price Deflator Indices
Figure A. 7 plots the consumer price index used to deflate the series in this 
paper. The series used is endorsed by the Deutsche Bundesbank (1976), and runs 
continuously with the exception of one gap covering World War II and the post­
war reconstruction period to the present day.
The index was assembled from four different sources. Up until 1914 the cost 
of living figures come from Kuczynski (1947), who investigated the standard of 
living of German workers since 1800. Kuczynski’s cost of living index consists of 
estimates of food prices and housing costs. From 1915 to 1919 the index is 
derived from calculations by the Statistisches Bundesamt, the Federal 
Statistical Bureau of post-World War II West Germany, made after World War II 
in order to close the gap between Kuczynski’s and the subsequent indices. From 
1920 to 1940 the cost of living index is that compiled for a five-person working- 
class household by the Statistisches Reichsamt, the National Statistical Bureau 
of first the Weimar Republic and then the Third Reich. For the post-World War 
II years from 1949 to the present, the cost of living index used is that calculated 





























































































German Consumer Price Index
The different consumer price series have different base years. They chart the 
changes in the price level for different consumption bundles, and are not 
completely consistent. Nevertheless, the indices have a relatively broad coverage 
of commodities even in the mid-nineteenth century years.
The Deutsche Bundesbank (1976) reports similar indices for wholesale 
prices. Figure A.8 plots the ratio of the consumer price index to the wholesale 
price index. The ratio of the indices exhibits a sharp jump in the 1870’s, 
extraordinarily erratic behavior during World War I and the post-World War I 
decade, and a substantial upward drift in the post-World War II era. The periods 
of greatest variation in the ratio of consumer to wholesale prices are, however, 




























































































Ratio of German Consumer to Wholesale Price Index
Figure A.8
Final Series
Finally, table A.l reports the final real stock prices and dividend series that 








































































































1876 0.048 -0.567 -3.598 -0.540
1877 0.054 -0.665 -3.578 -0.504
1878 0.052 -0.560 -3.513 -0.468
1879 0.052 -0.363 -3.312 -0.434
1880 0.050 -0.164 -3.160 -0.408
1881 0.049 -0.130 -3.142 -0.391
1882 0.050 -0.104 -3.104 -0.373
1883 0.049 -0.097 -3.109 -0.358
1884 0.048 -0.095 -3.124 -0.340
1885 0.046 -0.102 -3.184 -0.321
1886 0.044 -0.064 -3.197 -0.296
1887 0.048 -0.039 -3.079 -0.269
1888 0.055 0.066 -2.839 -0.248
1889 0.054 0.220 -2.700 -0.242
1890 0.059 0.164 -2.666 -0.249
1891 0.055 -0.004 -2.908 -0.259
1892 0.049 -0.038 -3.054 -0.249
1893 0.047 -0.019 -3.069 -0.228
1894 0.050 0.067 -2.933 -0.204
1895 0.047 0.200 -2.860 -0.188
1896 0.054 0.243 -2.675 -0.177
1897 0.054 0.272 -2.648 -0.179
1898 0.055 0.276 -2.618 -0.184
1899 0.055 0.297 -2.599 -0.193
1900 0.055 0.202 -2.691 -0.204
1901 0.047 0.069 -2.981 -0.207
1902 0.045 0.085 -3.028 -0.188
1903 0.049 0.126 -2.896 -0.165
1904 0.050 0.179 -2.821 -0.149
1905 0.051 0.233 -2.744 -0.138
1906 0.055 0.162 -2.740 -0.131
1907 0.057 0.070 -2.796 -0.124
1908 0.050 0.041 -2.953 -0.112
1909 0.050 0.079 -2.920 -0.089
1910 0.050 0.117 -2.874 -0.067
1911 0.052 0.092 -2.874 -0.045
1912 0.055 0.039 -2.861 -0.023
1913 0.054 0.000 -2.914 0.000
1914 • -0.020 • •
1915 • • • •
1916 * • • •




































































































1926 0.056 -0.927 -3.813 -0.935
1927 0.071 -0.596 -3.237 -0.910
1928 0.083 -0.687 -3.177 -0.929
1929 0.084 -0.801 -3.285 -0.957
1930 0.081 -0.969 -3.488 -0.977
1931 0.065 -1.133 -3.866 -0.978
1932 0.028 -1.465 -5.031 -0.952
1933 0.033 -1.228 -4.651 -0.885
1934 0.035 -1.115 -4.458 -0.825
1935 0.043 -0.974 -4.130 -0.769
1936 0.052 -0.881 -3.843 -0.721
1937 0.057 -0.773 -3.638 -0.683
1938 0.064 -0.804 -3.553 -0.653
1939 0.066 -0.865 -3.590 -0.626
1940 0.066 -0.702 -3.421 -0.595
1941 0.064 -0.550 -3.301 -0.573
1942 0.054 -0.536 -3.464 -0.557








1951 0.011 -1.567 -6.111 -1.316
1952 0.020 -1.800 -5.730 -1.241
1953 0.029 -1.717 -5.271 -1.169
1954 0.027 -1.445 -5.077 -1.102
1955 0.031 -1.017 -4.489 -1.038
1956 0.042 -1.094 -4.275 -0.986
1957 0.046 -1.115 -4.186 -0.941
1958 0.033 -0.876 -4.291 -0.898
1959 0.022 -0.324 -4.147 -0.848
1960 0.020 0.128 -3.805 -0.803
1961 0.025 0.132 -3.561 -0.770
1962 0.034 -0.149 -3.520 -0.750
1963 0.032 -0.179 -3.634 -0.732
1964 0.031 -0.088 -3.568 -0.705
1965 0.039 -0.217 -3.452 -0.680
1966 0.048 -0.400 -3.446 -0.661
1967 0.035 -0.373 -3.732 -0.642
1968 0.030 -0.103 -3.609 -0.605




























































































1970 0.044 -0.140 -3.267 -0.540
1971 0.040 -0.182 -3.407 -0.524
1972 0.031 -0.145 -3.627 -0.499
1973 0.037 -0.271 -3.562 -0.460
1974 0.044 -0.496 -3.629 -0.423
1975 0.035 -0.415 -3.764 -0.381
1976 0.036 -0.380 -3.698 -0.332
1977 0.041 -0.414 -3.617 -0.283
1978 0.047 -0.368 -3.428 -0.236
1979 0.054 -0.447 -3.359 -0.195
1980 0.060 -0.545 -3.358 -0.155
1981 0.058 -0.608 -3.451 -0.113
1982 0.049 -0.650 -3.668 -0.066
1983 0.033 -0.408 -3.806 -0.010
1984 0.036 -0.303 -3.624 0.051
1985 0.025 -0.015 -3.717 0.108
1986 0.027 0.334 -3.264 0.170
1987 0.044 0.194 -2.926 0.220
1988 0.035 0.016 -3.336 0.260
1989 0.029 0.233 -3.326 0.315




























































































Appendix 2: Monte Carlo Estimates of the Significance of Volatility Ratios
The post-World War II German stock market does show volatility ratios 
greater than one, and thus might provide some evidence of excess volatility. 
Table A.2 below reports Monte Carlo distributions of volatility ratios, computed 
to evaluate the statistical significance of the volatility ratios, calculated under 
the assumptions that the log level of dividends follows an error-correction model 
or that it follows an ARIMA process
The error correction model assumes that dividend policy is irrelevant to the 
firm’s value—that all money not paid out as dividends but reinvested in the 
firms that make up the market yields an expected increase in firm value of r, so 
that:
(A-l) EPt+1= G+r)[Pt-Dt|
Define the “permanent” level of dividends D*t as that level that allows real 
expected dividend payouts and prices to grow at an annual rate of g:
(A.2) D*i = (r-g)P
Suppose the representative firm desires to maintain a constant dividend yield of 
r-g and thus keep the dividend near to its “permanent” sustainable level, but 
also is averse to rapid upward or downward changes in dividends. Take a given 
year’s dividend is a weighted average of last year’s actual dividend (scaled up by 
the growth factor g) and this year’s “permanent” dividend:
(A.3) D = 0(l+g)Dtl + (l-6)D*t
where 0 is a weight between zero and one. The closer 0 is to zero, the less inertia 
there is in the dividend process and the more closely to dividends approximate a 
random walk. The closer 0 is to one, the slower are dividends to adjust and the 
larger are persistent shifts in the realized dividend growth rate.40
40Barsky and De Long (1989,1990) argue that the long swings in the U.S. stock market over the past century 
can be interpreted as due to investors’—perhaps irrational—expectations of such permanent or persistent shifts 













































































































0.05 0.998 0.992 1.065 0.934 0.991
0.10 1.001 1.017 1.130 0.955 1.003
0.50 1.011 1.112 1.519 1.076 1.041
0.90 1.039 1.393 2.846 1.341 1.167
0.95 1.057 1.494 3.346 1.432 1.242
0.99 1.080 1.763 5.167 1.641 1.420
Table A.2 reports the Monte Carlo distributions of the volatility ratio in line 
six of table 1, if the dividend process is the error-correction model given by 
equations (A.l), (A.2), and (A.3) for various values of the parameter 9 if the 
process is observed for a forty year period. The values of 0 chosen are intended to 
more than span the range of reasonable error-correction models. In addition, 
table A.2 reports the Monte Carlo distributions of the volatility ratios if the 
dividend process is—and investors know it to be—the IMA(1, 6) in levels 
estimated for dividends in the pre-World War I and post-World War II periods.41
As noted above, the pre-World War I German market does not show any 
signs of excess volatility. If anything, the volatility of the price-dividend ratio in 
the pre-World War I period is deficient: in only one of the Monte Carlo 
simulations—that for dividends following and known to follow the IMA(1, 6) 
estimated for the pre-World War I era—is there even a one percent chance of a 
value of the summed volatility ratios in line 6 of table 1 as low as the actual 
value observed.
The post-World War II period considered as a whole generates volatility 
ratios that are significant rejections of the null hypothesis on the high side for all 
generating processes considered save those with high values of 0. When 0 is near 
one year-to-year dividend level changes are small and shifts in dividend growth 
rates are persistent. Accordingly, the variability of the price-dividend ratio is 
large.42 A value of 0=0.8 implies that each year dividends adjust only one-fifth of
41The IMA process estimated was chosen to be integrated to allow shocks to the level of dividends to have 
permanent effects; the process was chosen to have a relatively large number of coefficients to allow it 
flexibility. Experiments with processes with AR components lead to similar significance levels.
42 A value of 0=0.8 implies that each year dividends adjust only one-fifth of the way to the “permanent” 
sustainable dividend level. This is a greater degree of relative smoothness in real dividends vis-a-vis prices than 
is in fact found in the sample. A value of 0=0.1 implies that each year dividends adjust ninety percent of the 




























































































the way to the “permanent” sustainable dividend level. This is a greater degree 
of relative smoothness in real dividends vis-a-vis prices than is in fact found in 
the sample. A value of 0=0.1 implies that each year dividends adjust ninety 
percent of the way to the “permanent” dividend level: this makes the price- 
dividend ratio too close to a constant to be consistent with the data.
Figures A.9 through A. 11 plot sample paths of simulated log prices and 
dividends for values of 0 equal to 0.1, to 0.5, and 0.8 in the Monte Carlo 
simulations underlying table A.2. These values of 0 are intended to more than 
span the range of reasonable error-correction models. The low 0 case has the 
current dividend move in a single year ninety percent of the way to the 
“permanent” expected annuity value of the stock market’s future payouts. As a 
result, in figure A.9 dividends are nearly proportional to prices and the 
stochastic process followed by both is very close to a random walk.
Since dividends are nearly proportional to prices, the distribution of the sum 
of volatility ratios reported in table 2 is very tightly clustered around one: the 
variability of prices relative to dividends is small, and the variability of both 
prices and dividends relative to perfect-foresight fundamentals are 
approximately equal. If the Monte Carlo distribution calculated for 0=0.1 is the 
correct distribution of volatility ratios under the efficient-markets and constant 
real interest rate null, then the pre-World War I German stock market exhibits 
statistically significant deficient volatility, and the post-Wirtschaftswunder 
market exhibits statistically significant excess volatility.
consistent with the data. Appendix II plots sample price and dividend series for various values of 0 from the 





























































































Sample Monte Carlo Price and Dividend Realization for 6=0.1
The intermediate 0 case has the current dividend move in a single year 
halfway to the “permanent” expected annuity value of the stock market’s future 
payouts. In figure A. 10 the year to year variability of relative changes in prices 
and dividends is closest to that observed in actual data. Dividends are not 
proportional to prices. Moreover, the sample average growth rate of prices and 
dividends is not known to investors ex ante: it depends on the average 
reinvestment rate, and the slow responsiveness of dividends to shifts in 
fundamentals makes the average reinvestment rate depend on shocks over the 
sample. Thus for 6=0.5 the sum of the volatility ratios reported in table A.2 does 
contain an upward bias—the median is 1.1 and not 1.0.
If the Monte Carlo distribution for 0=0.5 is a correct representation of the 
distribution of volatility ratios under the efficient-markets and constant real 
interest rate null, then the post-Wirtschaftswunder market exhibits statistically 
significant excess volatility, although less strongly so than was the case for 
0=0.1; the post-World War II period considered as a whole, however, does not. 
Moreover, the upward bias in the distribution of the sum of the volatility ratios 
makes the gap between the actual volatility ratios of the pre-World War I 





























































































Sample Monte Carlo Price and Dividend Realization for 6=0.5
The high 0 case has the current dividend move in a single year only twenty 
percent of way to the “permanent” expected annuity value of the stock market’s 
future payouts. As a result, in figure A.11 the sample path of dividends is very 
smooth, and far smoother than is observed in actual data. The sample average 
growth rate of prices and dividends is once more not known to investors ex ante: 
it depends on the average reinvestment rate, and the very slow responsiveness of 
dividends to shifts in fundamentals makes the average reinvestment rate depend 
heavily on shocks over the sample. Thus for 0=0.8 the sum of the volatility ratios 
reported in table A.2 contains a substantial upward bias—the median is 1.5, and 
not 1.0.
If the Monte Carlo distribution for the error-correction model with 0=0.8 is 
the correct distribution of volatility ratios under the efficient-markets and 
constant real discount rate null, then even the post-Wirtschaftswunder market 
fails to exhibit statistically significant excess volatility. The upward bias in the 
distribution of the sum of the volatility ratios makes the behavior of the pre- 
World War I German market even more anomalous: if 0=0.8, then there is only a 
five percent chance of observing a value for the sum of the volatility ratios of less 
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